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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between child labor and access to credit at a cross-
country level. Even though this link is theoretically central to child labor, so far there has
been little work done to assess its importance empirically. We measure child labor as a
country aggregate, and credit constraints are proxied by the extent of financial
development. These two variables display a strong negative relationship, which we show
is robust to selection on observables (by controlling for a wide range of variables such as
GDP per capita, urbanization, initial child labor, schooling, fertility, legal institutions,
inequality, and openness, and by allowing for a nonparametric functional form), and to
selection on unobservables (by allowing for fixed effects). We find that the magnitude of
the association between our proxy of access to credit and child labor is large in the sub-
sample of poor countries. Moreover, in the absence of developed financial markets,
households appear to resort substantially to child labor in order to cope with income
variability. This evidence suggests that policies aimed at widening households’ access to
credit could be effective in reducing the extent of child labor.
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Child labor is a troubling phenomenon.  It has been a concern of policy since at least the
19th Century (see Basu (1999), Section 2.2), and the debate on which policies should be
employed to reduce it - ranging from legislative bans on child labor, to trade sanctions
against countries that use child labor, to schooling subsidies for children - is long-
standing. As troubling as child labor is per se, it is essential to investigate its economic
determinants in order to inform policy choices and identify their welfare implications.
The evidence and existing literature suggest a strong link between child labor and
poverty (Krueger (1996)). In 1995 there were an estimated 120 million children engaged
in full-time paid work (see ILO (1996)). In the same year, the incidence of child labor
was 2.3% among countries in the upper quartile of GDP per capita, and 34% among
countries in the lowest quartile of GDP per capita. If this link is causal and there are no
market inefficiencies, we would expect promoting general economic development to
reduce child labor. However, other mechanisms can also account for the observed
relationship between child labor and poverty. In particular, market failures – which are
arguably more common where poverty is widespread – or externalities might be the
actual cause of child labor. For example, if private returns to education are lower than
social returns, child labor can be inefficiently high. In this case, government intervention
in the specific market where the inefficiency occurs is to be preferred (Grootaert and
Kanbur, (1995)).
The work in this paper goes in this direction. We explore the nexus between child
labor and one possible source of inefficiency - the presence of borrowing constraints. By
providing evidence that child labor arises in response to a particular form of inefficiency,
this work indicates that the issue of child labor can be in part addressed independently of
solving the (more complex) problem of general economic development.
At the household level, child labor arises from an inter-temporal trade-off. By
entering the job market at an early age, an individual can make an immediate contribution
to household income and perhaps gain labor market experience. This addition to earnings
potentially carries a long-term cost to the extent that the time children spend working
could be used instead in activities that build up their long-run human capital. The nature
2of this cost depends on the alternatives to child labor, such as schooling or time spent in
play (which also contributes to cognitive development). The key economic variable that
allows households to make this trade-off optimally is access to credit - households can
borrow against future income and can also smooth earnings shocks without recourse to
child labor.
Even though access to credit is central to child labor theoretically, there has been
little work done to assess its importance empirically (see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern
(2001)). In this paper, we pursue a cross-country strategy. We measure child labor as a
country aggregate, and credit constraints are proxied by the extent of financial
intermediation. These two variables display a strong negative (unconditional) relationship
(see Figure 1). Of course to determine the strength of the relationship we must control for
other important variables. The existing literature on child labor provides some guidance.
As noted in most empirical studies on child labor, income is a crucial variable, since
regardless of access to credit child labor is strongly associated with poverty. Likewise,
the literature suggests that schooling, fertility patterns, ruralization, and openness might
be important determinants of child labor. Our results show a strong link between child
labor and access to credit even when these factors are accounted for and a range of
estimation techniques is used. This relationship appears to be particularly sizeable in the
sample of poor countries, which have both less developed financial markets and greater
child labor and, as such, are in general of greater policy interest. Moreover, we find that
income variability has a sizeable impact on child labor in countries where financial
markets are underdeveloped, suggesting that households resort to their children’s work to
cope with income shocks. This is not the case though when financial markets are
developed, which suggests that access to credit might effectively cut households’
demands on children’s time.
The importance of this result is twofold. First, it establishes the empirical
relevance of a significant strand of the theoretical literature on child labor. Second, it
clearly points at a policy mechanism that might help alleviate the problem of child labor.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the data and presents our results. Section 4 examines the robustness
of our results. Section 5 concludes.
32. Review of the Literature
The empirical literature on child labor is vast (see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001)),
and the more recent theoretical literature is also substantial (see Basu (1999)). In this
section, we highlight the papers that are essential to our empirical strategy.
2.1 The Modeling Framework
Basu (1999) partitions the theoretical literature into two groups - papers that
examine intra-household bargaining (between parents, or parents and children) and those
that examine extra-household bargaining (where the household is a single unit and
bargains with employers). Both frameworks are potentially valid for our analysis, and
suggest different factors that might influence child labor.
In the intra-household bargaining framework, child labor is the outcome of a
bargaining process between members of the household, for example parents and children
(see Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994) and Moehling (1995)) or the father and the
mother (who is assumed to care for the children more than the father, see Galasso
(1999)). The weight that each member receives can depend upon his or her contribution
to the family’s resources. Collectively, child labor may be desirable because it contributes
to the family income, and it may be desirable to the child because it increases his or her
weight in the family decision function.  Within this framework the key variables are those
that determine the relative bargaining strength of different members of the household.
This could include wealth, the number, age, and gender of children, and earnings (wages)
if an individual were to work (regardless of whether this is observed or not).
The extra-household bargaining framework considers each household as a unitary
entity (see, amongst others, Becker (1964) and Gupta (1998)). The motivation behind this
approach is that children’s bargaining power is inherently very limited, so that parents
determine to what extent a child works without necessarily considering the child’s
welfare.1 The parents and the employer bargain about the child’s wage and the fraction of
                                                
1 However, if parents are altruistic, they face a meaningful trade-off between the benefit of child labor and
its cost. We will discuss this mechanism in detail in Section 2.2.
4that wage to be paid as food to the child. Within this framework the key variables are
those that determine the relative bargaining strength of the household vis à vis the
employer. These also include household wealth variables as well as access to credit.
2.2 The Role of Access to Credit
The role of credit markets in determining the extent of child labor has been
addressed by a recent strand of the theoretical literature (Parsons and Goldin (1989),
Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (1999, 2001) and Rosati and Tzannatos (2000)).
Analytically this question is closely related to the literature on bequests within altruistic,
unitary models of the family à la Becker (1974). That literature has highlighted that the
non-negativity constraint in bequests can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources
within the family (see for example Becker and Murphy (1988)). In particular, if parents
care about their children but bequests are at a corner, child labor is not generally efficient.
The basic intuition is that child labor creates a trade-off between current and future
income. Putting children to work raises current family income, but by interfering with
children’s human capital development, it reduces future income. This future income is, of
course, realized by the children and not the parents. Thus, if there are positive bequests,
parents can compensate themselves for foregone current income by reducing bequests.
Conversely, if bequests are at a corner – which is more likely to occur for poorer
households – parents will tend to draw on child labor too heavily.
Even if conditions exist for an efficient allocation of child labor from an
intergenerational perspective (i.e., bequests are positive), parents might still choose an
inefficiently high level of labor for their children if they cannot borrow to smooth their
consumption over time, i.e. if the intragenerational allocation of resources is constrained.
The following model, adapted from Baland and Robinson (2000), illustrates this point
analytically.
Consider a two-period model where the parent and the child live
contemporaneously. In each period the parent supplies labor inelastically, earning income
A. In period 1, the parent decides how much to save for the following period, s, as well as
the extent to which his child will work, ]1,0[Îcl . When working in period 1, the child
5earns lc, which the parent can appropriate completely. In period 2, the child, now an
adult, will supply one unit of labor, which will earn her an income of )1( clh - , where h is
the human capital accumulated in period 1. h(·) is decreasing in lc and is strictly concave,
with h(0)=1.
We assume that the parent is altruistic. He cares about his own consumption in
periods 1 and 2, 1pc and 
2
pc  respectively, and, to the extent l, about the child’s utility.
Because of altruism, in period 2 the parent might want to leave a bequest b to the child.
For simplicity, parental utility is additively separable and there is no intertemporal
discount. The child is selfish and cares only about her own consumption cc  (for further
simplicity, the child only consumes in period 2).
The parent’s utility function is
)()()( 21 ccppp cWcucuW l++=
where )( cc cW is the child’s utility function and u(·) and Wi(·) are concave and well-
behaved functions.






The child’s budget constraint is
blhc cc +-= )1( .
In order to illustrate how inefficiently high child labor might emerge if individuals
cannot borrow, we focus on the case where 0³s .2 The first order conditions are as
follows:
(1) with respect to b )()(' '2 ccp cWcu l= if b>0
(2) with respect to s )(')(' 21 pp cucu ³ if  s>0
(3) with respect to lc )1(')()(' '1 cccp lhcWcu -= l
6In this setup, the chosen level of child labor is efficient when the marginal return
to time spent in school equals its marginal cost (the opportunity cost of child labor). Here
the return to education is )1( clh - and the opportunity cost of child labor is lc. Efficient
child labor is therefore defined by 1)1(' =- clh . Conversely, child labor is inefficiently
high if 1)1(' >- clh . Baland and Robinson (2000) show that if s=0 (i.e. if the borrowing
constraint is actually binding), the parent will choose to make his child work too much. If
in period 1 the parent wished he could borrow but cannot do so, his consumption will be
lower and its marginal utility higher than optimal, )(')(' 21 pp cucu > . Substituting for
)(' 2pcu  from (1) and )('
1
pcu  from (3), it easily follows that 1)1(' >- clh . Intuitively, if the
parent cannot smooth consumption between period 1 and 2 through borrowing, he will
use child labor to increase consumption in period 1 at the expense of his child’s human
capital accumulation.
This model suggests that the availability of credit should be a factor that predicts
the incidence of child labor. Moreover, if such an effect is found, it will provide evidence
that the child labor we observe is in fact inefficient.  Since our empirical work is at the
aggregate level, we will use the degree of development of financial markets in a country
as a measure of the credit constraints that individuals face.
2.3 Empirical Work
At the level of micro data, there is a range of empirical studies that examine the
causes of child labor. In a recent volume, Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) review findings
from Côte D’Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia, and the Philippines. Other authors have
examined child labor in Ghana (Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997)) and Vietnam
(Edmonds and Pavcnik (2001)). A consistent finding is that child labor is associated with
poverty. This, of course, is what we would anticipate, and it underlines the necessity of
controlling for income in our empirical analysis. Among other determinants of child labor
                                                                                                                                                
2 For simplicity, we allow only transfers from the parent to the child and derive first order conditions under
the assumption that b>0.
7at the individual level are the child’s age and gender, education and employment of the
parents, and rural versus urban location.  From this list, it is of course difficult at the
aggregate level to control for household-specific attributes such as gender composition
and age, but we can control for education and the degree of urbanization of a country.
At the cross-country level, much work has gone into creating a uniform definition
of child labor. Two significant efforts in this direction are Ashagrie (1993) and Grootaert
and Kanbur (1995). These previous analyses are more concerned with measuring the
extent of child labor than with estimating the effect of various country characteristics on
the degree of child labor. Krueger (1996) establishes a strong negative relationship
between the prevalence of child labor and national income, a finding which is confirmed
in the present study. Krueger also shows that there is little evidence (at least in the United
States) that the support for banning imports made with child labor is linked to the
potential benefits to domestic rent seekers (i.e., unskilled labor, who might benefit from
such a ban).
Although (to our knowledge) the link between access to credit and child labor has
not been examined directly, it has been examined indirectly in two ways. First, the
literature on the causes of child labor has noted a link between household assets and child
labor (see Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2001)). To the
extent that assets can serve as collateral for borrowing, this link suggests that access to
credit might play a role. Of course, the evidence is indirect, and might also be picking up
wealth effects. Second, there are some significant papers that examine the link between
credit and schooling choices. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examine the completeness of
credit markets in a dataset of six Indian villages. They find that households are not fully
able to insure themselves against unanticipated idiosyncratic income shocks, and as a
result reduce schooling. Jacoby (1994), using data from Peru, finds that children in
households with lower levels of income and durable goods (consequently, presumably
with a lower access to credit) are more likely to repeat grades at school. Flug,
Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim (1998) examine the effect of financial development on
schooling using cross-sectional country data, and find a negative and significant effect.
These papers are complementary to the present study, because – as shown by Ravallion
8and Wodon (1999) for data from Bangladesh – schooling and child labor are not one-for-
one substitutes.
3. Data, Specification, and Results
The availability of child labor data (see below) allows us to build a panel for 172
countries for the years 1950-60, 70, 80, 90, 95. For this dataset we first estimate a
parsimonious specification where we control for some basic determinants of child labor.
We then add to this specification our variable of interest  (a proxy for the availability of
credit within a country), and investigate whether access to credit is effective in
dampening risk by adding to the specification a measure of income volatility. In the next
section, we perform a number of robustness checks, which include estimating our
specification without outliers, adding to the regression a number of other variables that, if
not accounted for, might generate an omitted variable problem, and allowing for fixed
effects and flexible functional form.
3.1 Data description
We measure the extent of child labor (CHILDLAB) as the percentage of the
population in the 10-14-age range that is actively engaged in work. These data were
compiled by the ILO and are available at ten-year intervals starting from 1950 for 172
countries. “Active population” includes people who worked (for wage or salary, in cash
or in kind as well as for family unpaid work) for at least one hour during the reference
period (ILO (1996)). The structure of the data does not allow us to infer the intensity of
child labor, so that we cannot distinguish between light child work (that some might
argue to be beneficial for adolescents) and full-time labor that might seriously conflict
with human capital accumulation. Moreover, like most official data on child labor, these
data are likely to suffer from underreporting, as work by children is illegal or restricted
by law in most countries and children are often employed in the informal sector. These
problems notwithstanding, the ILO data has the advantage of being adjusted on a basis of
9the internationally accepted definitions, thereby allowing cross-countries comparisons
(Ashagrie (1993)).
As a proxy for the absence of credit constraints we use the ratio of private credit
issued by deposit-money banks to GDP (the variable CREDIT, which we refer to
interchangeably as “access to credit” or “financial development”). This variable isolates
credit issued to the private sector (as opposed to credit issued to governments and public
enterprises) and captures the degree of activity of financial intermediaries that is most
relevant to our investigation: the channeling of savings into lending (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (1999)). Using data on nearly 3,000 small and medium firms and 48
countries from the World Business Environment Survey dataset, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimov (2002) show that this credit variable is negatively and significantly
correlated with the degree of firms’ financing constraints (a correlation of -0.20,
significant at 1%).3 To the extent that small and medium enterprises face financing
problems similar to those of households, this lends support to our use of this proxy.
However, it also underlines the fact that financial intermediation has an effect not only on
households, but also on the producer side of the economy. As such our access to credit
proxy embodies both of these effects, and can be interpreted more broadly as capturing
the effect of financial development (see King and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales
(1998)).
Figures 2 and 3 graph, respectively, the incidence of child labor in different
regions of the world and the evolution of child labor and credit over time. The two
variables are plotted in Figure 1. To proxy for economic volatility we follow Flug et al.
(1999) and construct the standard deviation of annual per capita income growth rates in
the previous 5 (and 10) years. We expect that more children enter the labor force when
economic volatility is high, all the more so if financial institutions are underdeveloped
and credit cannot be used by families to smooth consumption over time.
The various specifications account for a number of other controls, including linear
and squared log GDP per capita (LRGDPPC and LRGDPPC2), percentage of rural
population (RURAL), continent dummies, share of imports (IMP) and exports (EXP) of
                                                
3 More precisely, it is correlated with enterprise managers’ perceptions about how large an obstacle
financing issues are for their business. For more details, see Beck et al. (2002).
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GDP, fertility (FERTILITY), the ratification of the 1973 Geneva convention on child
labor (RATIFY), origin of the legal system (LEGAL ORIGIN), and income inequality
(GINI). All of the variables and their sources are described in the Appendix.  In Section
4, we discuss in detail the possible bias that excluding each variable might generate in the
estimated coefficient on credit. Tables 1 and 2 report averages of and correlations among
the variables.
3.2 Basic Specification
The empirical literature on child labor uniformly indicates that income is the
single most important household-level predictor of child labor (in general, the children of
poor families are more likely to work).  It seems reasonable to expect that income is an
important determinant of child labor at the aggregate level as well. To control for this
effect we include in our specification (the log of) per capita income and allow for linear
and quadratic terms (LRGDPPC and LRGDPPC2).
Child labor is highly correlated over time. The correlation between child labor in
1950 and child labor in 1980 is around 0.9. Consequently it is important to control for
initial conditions, and we include the level of child labor in 1950 (CHILD50) in our
specification. In some sense, including child labor in 1950 amounts to controlling for a
country-specific effect, and purges to some extent the spurious cross-sectional correlation
that is often problematic in cross-country regressions. (In Section 4.2 we address this
issue more directly, by allowing for fixed effects.) We also include in the equation the
percentage of rural population to control for the fact that in developing countries (and
also historically in developed countries) child labor is strongly associated with
agricultural work. Finally, we allow for a time trend.
The baseline specification is therefore:
Child laborit = f(constant, time trendt, log real GDP per capitait, log real GDP per
capita2it, percentage of rural populationit, child labor in 1950i)
11
We first estimate the equation using OLS. The results are reported in Table 3, column (1).
Both income terms are highly significant, with child labor reaching a minimum at a per
capita income of $2,891. As anticipated, initial child labor is highly significant. Rural
population turns out to be significant only at the 10 per cent level. Finally, the time trend
is negative and significant.
One important feature of data on child labor is the presence of a substantial
proportion of zeros. Of the 703 data points used in column (1), over 20 percent are zero.
The OLS assumption of linearity (and implicitly normality for the standard errors) might
not be appropriate in this context. Thus, we also present results for a Tobit estimate. In
column (4), we see that the sign of the coefficients is the same, but the magnitude of the
impacts differ somewhat. Since the Tobit specification accounts for the mass point in the
outcome distribution and is potentially less sensitive to outliers in the data, the Tobit
specification seems to be more appropriate. As a robustness check, we present both sets
of estimates throughout the paper.
3.3 The availability of credit
We now introduce our measure of credit availability into the basic specification.
The OLS results for the estimation in the full sample are presented in Table 3, column
(2). Credit enters with the expected sign (negative – as the aggregate availability of credit
increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases), and is statistically significant, even
after controlling for income, initial child labor, rural population, and a time trend. When
using a Tobit specification, the coefficient on credit is more than twice as large as OLS
and strongly significant.4
As a test of robustness we exclude outliers from the regressions. With 474
observations and 135 countries, extreme observations might in principle be quite
influential. We employ the Hadi (1992) selection criterion for outliers in multivariate
regressions.5 Four countries (Myanmar, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Zaire) are
                                                
4 Throughout the paper , we report marginal coefficients for Tobit.
5 Hadi’s (1992) technique is particularly useful to identify outliers in a multivariate regression setting and is
based on a procedure that recursively defines distance of an observation from a cluster of observations in
the model.
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identified as outliers in this context. We rerun the OLS and Tobit specifications without
these outliers. For OLS the magnitude of the coefficient of credit increases by 30%, and
the estimate is even more significant. For the Tobit, the magnitude and significance of the
marginal coefficient are unaffected.
We then estimate our specification for the sub-samples of rich and poor countries
(where we split the data by mean GDP per capita). This is a natural dimension along
which to search for heterogeneity in the effect of credit. We would imagine the effect to
be greater for poorer countries, where improvements in access to credit are presumably
extending the basic infrastructure of financial markets. Instead the effect of access to
credit in richer countries is presumably higher-order and less likely to affect households.
This is confirmed by our results in Table 4, for both the OLS and Tobit specifications.
The effect of credit is significant in both sub-samples but is several orders of magnitude
larger in poor countries than in rich countries.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient in the full sample is small, relative for
example to the effect of GDP per capita. For the OLS estimates, a one standard deviation
increase in access to credit is associated with a decrease of five per cent of a standard
deviation in child labor. For Tobit, a one standard deviation increase in access to credit is
associated with more than ten per cent of a standard deviation decrease in child labor. In
contrast, the magnitude of the effect of GDP per capita is much larger. If a country were
to move from the 5th to the 10th percentile of GDP per capita in 1995 (i.e., from $504 to
$618), child labor would decrease by 3 to 5.5 percentage points, on a base prevalence of
child labor of 39% for that level of income. In contrast, moving between the same
percentiles of access to credit would lead only to a 0.05 to 0.1 percentage point decrease
in child labor. Nonetheless, it is plausibly easier to increase household access to credit
than to induce general economic development, so it might be reasonable to consider
larger increases in the level of access to credit.6 For example, a move from the 25th to the
75th percentile of access to credit would bring about a 1 to 2.4 percentage point decrease
in child labor.
                                                
6 More precisely, though it is also difficult to increase the level of financial development of a country, it is
presumably easier to increase household access to credit, which is the underlying variable of interest, for
example by targeting credit to poorer households with children.
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Moreover, for the countries of greatest policy interest – poorer countries, which
have both a lower level of financial development and higher child labor – the magnitude
of the effect is much larger. A move from the 25th to the 75th percentile of access to credit
in a poor country is associated with a 4.2 percentage point decrease in child labor.7
3.4 The effect of income variability
Our results confirm that the availability of credit – as proxied by financial
development – plays a significant role in explaining child labor. However, there are
several pathways through which this effect could operate. Table 3 does not shed light on
which mechanisms are empirically relevant. Access to credit obviously has an effect
economic growth and long-run income, but by controlling for the level of GDP per
capita, we are accounting for this effect to some extent. In Table 5, we explore another
possible mechanism - smoothing income shocks.
As outlined in Section 2, families might resort to sending their children to work to
help them cope with negative income shocks. Nonetheless, if credit is widely available,
households can borrow to smooth income variability and might not need to disrupt their
children’s education (or leisure time). When we introduce our measure of income
volatility (SDGROW5, the standard deviation of annual GDP growth in the previous 5
years) into the specification, we see that the estimated coefficient is large and highly
significant, suggesting that households indeed use child labor to cope with income
volatility.8 In principle, though, the variability of income should affect child labor mostly
in those countries where credit is not accessible. To investigate this possible effect, we
split the sample into high and low credit groups, using the mean as the cutoff. In Table 5,
column (2) (column (5), for Tobit), we see that for the low credit group, income
variability enters the specification significantly and the magnitude of the coefficient is
                                                
7 Not surprisingly, when we split the sample by level of income, quadratic income loses its significance in
three out of four specifications. The size and significance of the coefficient on CREDIT remain virtually
unchanged if we exclude the quadratic term in income and control only for linear income.
8 Results are virtually the same when instead of SDGROW5 we use SDGROW10, the standard deviation of
annual GDP growth in the previous 10 years.
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substantial. Instead, for the high credit group (columns (3) and (6)), the effect of income
volatility on child labor is small and not significantly different from zero.9
4. Robustness checks
A significant concern regarding our results in Section 3, and more generally a concern
regarding all cross-country regressions, is whether the effect of credit availability on
child labor is truly causal. To be confident of identifying a causal effect we must control
for factors – both observed and unobserved – that influence selection into a particular
level of credit availability. Because of the interrelatedness of macro-level variables, this
is an inherently difficult condition to satisfy.  We extend the empirical framework in
three directions to check for the robustness of our results. First we consider additional
control variables (hence examine sensitivity to selection on observables). Second, we
consider fixed-effects models (hence examine sensitivity to selection on unobservables).
Third, we consider propensity score estimates (a nonparametric estimator which
considers sensitivity to functional form selection).
4.1 Additional Controls
We now subject our result to a battery of additional controls. Our interest is not to
interpret the additional coefficients causally, since some of the variables we add are
potentially endogenous with respect to child labor. The additional controls are intended
instead to confirm that the significance of credit is not simply attributable to omitted
variable bias. Estimates are reported in Table 6 (for OLS) and Table 7 (for Tobit).
First, we add continent dummies. When estimated with OLS, the magnitude of the
credit variable decreases, and it is no longer statistically significant at the conventional
level, while the magnitude and significance of credit are not substantially affected in the
Tobit estimation (Tables 6 and 7, column (1)). In both the OLS and Tobit estimates, the
coefficient on the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that
the high prevalence of child labor in this region is due to factors (cultural, institutional)
                                                
9 These estimates do not appear to be sensitive to outliers.
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other than income level, prevalence of rural population, and development of financial
markets. As an additional robustness check (results not reported), we reestimate the
relationship, excluding countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, and find that the credit
coefficient remains significant.10
We then control for primary and secondary (female) school enrollment (Tables 6
and 7, columns (2) and (3)).  At the household level there is a close connection between
the prevalence of education and child labor. Over the long run, the availability of
education gives rise to an important inter-temporal trade-off in the time allocation of
children. Time spent in schoolwork may displace time spent in work, but also creates a
stream of future returns to education. Of course, schooling is not a full-time activity, so
this tradeoff may not be very extreme – schooling and child labor might co-exist at the
expense of leisure activities (see Ravallion and Wodon (1999)). Presumably for
secondary schooling the trade-off is more substantial. The empirical results bear out this
reasoning. Primary enrollment enters the specification negatively (more schooling, less
child labor), but is only marginally significant. Instead, secondary enrollment is negative
and highly significant. Because of potential endogeneity problems in the specification
with enrollment, these coefficients should not be interpreted causally. Our interest is in
the robustness of the credit coefficient. Here we find that the OLS coefficient on credit is
smaller (though still significant). The Tobit coefficient is much more robust to the
inclusion of schooling controls.
We next control for the level of fertility. Fertility is strongly tied to child labor.
Larger, poorer families might need to send their children to work to help support the
family. On the other hand, couples might want to have more children if they think that the
children can bring a net increase in family income and if child labor is a widespread
phenomenon in their community. When fertility is included in the regression, the
magnitude of the coefficient on credit in the OLS decreases, and in fact is no longer
statistically significant. However, five outlier countries drive this result. 11 Once these
                                                
10 We also check for robustness to the exclusion of countries from Eastern and Central Europe, because of
potential measurement error problems with child labor in former Soviet-bloc countries.
11 These countries (Myanmar, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Zaire) are selected using Hadi’s
(1992) methodology.
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countries are excluded, the t-statistic on the credit variable increases to 2.13. Finally, the
Tobit estimates of the credit coefficient are robust to the inclusion of fertility.
A potential source of spurious correlation for the credit estimates are legal
institutions, which both influence the development of financial intermediation and the
enforcement of child labor laws. We proxy for this effect by including dummy variables
that identify the historic origins – British, French, etc. – of the countries’ legal systems.
None of these dummies is significant, individually or jointly. The OLS estimate of the
credit variable is marginally weakened while the Tobit coefficient is virtually unaffected
(Tables 6 and 7, column (5)).
In order to control more directly for a country’s commitment to fight against child
labor, we include in the specification a dummy (RATIFY) indicating whether the country
has ratified the 1973 ILO convention against child labor – also known as the Minimum
Age Convention – which specifies fifteen years of age as the cutoff age for participating
in economic activity.12 Note that only 93 out of the 207 countries originally in our sample
have ratified the convention (the US, for example, is not a signatory to the convention).
When RATIFY is included in the regression, the significance of the credit variable is
weakened in the OLS specification. However, when four outlier observations are
excluded, the credit variable is again significant (at the 10% level)13. Moreover, its
significance is unaffected in the Tobit specification (Tables 6 and 7, column (9)). The
dummy itself is not significant.
We also consider variables measuring the openness of the economy (exports and
imports as percentages of GDP). If  “all good things go together”, the prevalence of child
labor might simply reflect openness of the economies, while, at the same time, more open
countries might also be those with more developed financial markets. Moreover, recent
microeconomic evidence from Vietnam suggests that “greater market integration appears
to be associated with less child labor” (Edmonds and Pavcnik (2001)). Interestingly,
import and export shares are not significant. The credit variable remains significant in
both sets of estimates.
                                                
12 Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment no.138, 1973, ILO, Geneva.
13 Outliers are identified by Hadi’s (1992) methodology.
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Finally, the degree of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient)
could be an important source of spurious correlation in the regression (for example, the
correlation table highlights that the Gini coefficient displays a significant unconditional
correlation with both child labor and credit). Accounting for inequality does not appear to
affect estimate and significance of the coefficient on credit.
Overall, we find that the credit variable is robust to the inclusion of a wide range
of controls. Although the magnitude and the significance of the OLS coefficient are
sensitive to some of the controls (in particular Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, fertility, and
the ratification dummy), estimates from the Tobit specifications are uniformly stable.
4.2 Selection on Unobservables
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the possibility of
selection on unobservables. Because of the panel-data structure of the dataset, we can
control for selection on unobservables by including fixed (random) effects in our linear
regression (Tobit) model. The fixed effect allows us to control for time-invariant
selection effects. We, of course, remain exposed to time-varying omitted variables. Table
8 presents the results.
In column (1) we see that using a fixed-effects model the estimated coefficient of
credit in fact changes sign; it is positive and statistically significant. This qualifies our
result that increased availability of credit causes a reduction in the prevalence of child
labor. In Tables 3 and 7 we noted that the Tobit is less sensitive to changes in
specification, because the mass point at zero child labor anchors the estimates. In Table 8,
the same holds true. Considering a random-effects Tobit model, the effect is negative for
the entire sample period, though smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.
As in Table 4, it is instructive to consider the estimated effect of credit for the
subsamples of poor and rich countries, splitting the sample at mean GDP per capita. The
poorer countries are in general of greater policy interest, since they have both less
developed financial markets and greater child labor. In Table 8 we see that allowing for
fixed (random) effects the estimated effect is negative and significant for the sub-sample
of poor countries for the OLS (Tobit) specification, though the magnitude is smaller. The
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effect is positive for richer countries in the OLS specification, and negative and
insignificant for the Tobit specification.
Thus, though our result is not robust for richer countries, for poorer countries,
which is the group of greater policy interest for child labor issues, the result is robust to
the inclusion of country-specific effects.
4.3 Sensitivity to Functional Form Assumptions: Nonparametric Estimates
In this section we consider the implications of relaxing the functional form
assumptions that are implicit in our regression models. Though we considered higher-
order terms of some variables, such as log real GDP per capita, in general one must be
cautious about functional form issues, especially when, as in our case, estimates are
extrapolated across a highly heterogeneous group of countries. Propensity score
estimation (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); see also Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
(1997,1998), Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), and Lechner (2002)) offers a
nonparametric means to address this concern. Propensity score estimation assumes that
there is a discrete (initially binary) treatment, and that selection is based on observable
variables. We first estimate the probability of assignment to a “treated” country (i.e., a
country with well-developed financial markets) conditional on the observables. Then the
Propensity Score Theorem establishes that, within groups that are homogeneous on the
propensity score, the entire distribution of covariates is balanced across the treated and
untreated groups. In particular, we use kernel propensity score matching (Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997,1998)), in which each treated country is matched to the
untreated countries according to propensity score distance, weighted using a Gaussian
kernel. The results are presented in Table 9.
In the first column, we use our base specification from Table 3 but exclude initial
child labor. In the second column we control for initial child labor (in 1950). In the third
column we control for lagged child labor. The estimator in the third column is most
comparable to fixed effects, more particularly to a first-differences estimator. However,
rather than first differencing, by controlling for lagged child labor we consider “quasi-
differences”. The estimated effect on child labor is negative and statistically significant in
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all three columns. The fact that the quasi-differenced propensity score estimate in column
(3) is negative is noteworthy because of its affinity with the fixed effects estimator - by
(quasi-) differencing it allows for unobservables, but it also controls for observables
flexibly via the propensity score. This suggests that our result is robust to both selection
on observables and unobservables, when we control for the observables sufficiently
flexibly.
The order of magnitude of the estimate is similar to the estimates in Table 3. In
Table 3, the estimated OLS coefficient is –0.033. If we think of moving from low credit
to high credit as moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of access to credit, then this
corresponds to an effect of -0.01 on child labor. In Table 9 the estimates for the binary
treatment range from –0.0093 to –0.013.
A limitation of the results in Table 9 is that they assume a binary treatment,
whereas access to credit is a continuous variable. The propensity score methodology can
be extended to discrete, multi-valued treatments (see Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001)).
In Table 10 we apply propensity score matching to a multi-valued treatment, with
treatment 1 to treatment 4 corresponding to the quartiles of the access to credit variable.
The notion of being “treated” is now more nuanced. For example, if a country is initially
under treatment 2, greater access to credit corresponds to being exposed to treatments 3
or 4 or a reduced access to credit corresponds to being exposed to treatment 1. Thus in
Table 10, the columns correspond to the treatment to which countries are currently
exposed, and in the rows we consider the treatment levels to which they could –
counterfactually –be assigned.
A priori we imagine that the treatment effects below the diagonal should be
negative, since these correspond to moving from a lower- to a higher-credit country.
Likewise, above the diagonal, treatment effects should be positive. Inspecting Table 10,
we note that this pattern holds: all of the below-diagonal estimates are negative, and all of
the above-diagonal estimates are positive. In general the above-diagonal estimates are not
precisely estimated; none of the estimates is statistically significant. Among the below-
diagonal terms the largest magnitudes and most significant effects are in row 4. Moving
up to the highest level of access to credit has a negative and significant impact on child
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labor. Likewise moving from the second to the third level of access to credit also has a
negative and significant impact.
Thus propensity score matching methods confirm the robustness of our result.
Even when we allow for a flexible functional form, the effect of credit on child labor is
negative and significant. Overall, our robustness checks confirm that this effect is not an
artifact of selection on observables, selection on unobservables, nor naïve functional form
assumptions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between child labor and access to
credit across countries. The theoretical literature has highlighted the importance of this
relationship, suggesting that, in presence of credit constraints, (inefficient) child labor
might arise whenever parents are prevented from trading off resources intertemporally.
Our empirical results confirm the existence of a significant association between child
labor and the share of private credit issued by banks to GDP, which we interpret as a
proxy of access to credit. This relationship appears to be particularly large in the sample
of poor countries, which have both less developed financial markets and greater child
labor and, as such, are of greater policy interest. We also provide evidence that strong
financial markets dampen the impact of income variability on child labor, which would
otherwise be sizeable.
As with most work on cross-country data, caution must be used in interpreting the
estimated coefficients causally. There are many potential sources of spurious correlation
and selection. We subjected our result to a wide array of robustness checks, including
adding a range of controls (linear and squared income, share of rural population,
continent dummies, fertility, primary and secondary school enrollment, import and
exports shares, and ratification of the 1973 ILO convention on child labor), considering
fixed effects, and allowing for a nonparametric choice of functional form. The
relationship remains strong under all of these alternatives.
These results are important for two reasons. First, they confirm the empirical
relevance of a recent strand of the theoretical literature on child labor. Second, these
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results open an important policy window on alleviating the problem of child labor.
Increasing household access to credit can be an effective tool in reducing the extent of
child labor, and has distinct advantages over other remedies. Compared to legal
restrictions and direct bans, it can decrease child labor without lowering household
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APPENDIX: Data Description and Sources
CHILDLABOR Share of the active population between age 10 and 14 over
total population between 10 and 14. Active population
includes people who, during the reference period,
performed “some work” for wage or salary, in cash or in
kind. The notion of “some work” is interpreted as work for
at least 1 hour during the reference period. Source: ILO.
CREDIT Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. Source:
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Ln(GDPPC) Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant
dollars, chain Index, expressed in international prices, base
1985. Source: Summers-Heston, years 1960-1990.
RURAL Rural population, as % of total population. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank.
SDGROW5 Standard deviation of per capita GDP growth over the
previous 5 years.
SCH_PRIF Gross primary female school enrollment (%). Gross
enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless
of age, to the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to the level of education shown. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank.
SCH_SECF Gross secondary female school enrollment (%). Gross
enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless
of age, to the population of the age group that officially
corresponds to the level of education shown. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank.
FERT Fertility rate, total births per woman. Total fertility rate
represents the number of children that would be born to a
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing
years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-
specific fertility rates. Source: World Development
Indicators, World Bank.
EXP Share of exports on GDP. Source: World Development
Indicators, World Bank.
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IMP Share of imports on GDP. Source: World Development
Indicators, World Bank.
RATIFY Dummy variable taking value of 1 if a country has ratified
the ILO’s Minimum Age convention (Convention no.138,
ILO, Geneva, 1973).
LEGAL ORIGIN Origin of a country’s legal system. These dummies classify
the legal origin of the Company Law or of Commercial
Code of each country. The identified origins are five: (1)
English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3)
German Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial
Code; (5) Socialist/Communist laws. Source: La Porta et al.
(1998), extended from “Foreign Laws: Current Sources of
Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World” and CIA
World Factbook.
GINI Ten-year average of the Gini coefficient over the period
(e.g. 1960 is the average of 1951-1960; 1970 is the average
of 1961-1970, etc.). Source: Deininger and Squire (1996).
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Table 1: Data Description
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
 
Child labor 860 0.15 0.17 0 0.79




631 0.04 0.04 0.00059 0.79
log real GDP
per capita
705 7.76 1.06 5.41 10.58
Percent rural
population
857 54.58 24.94 0 98.2
Share of exports
of GDP
630 32.6 24.38 1.19 215.38
Share of imports
of GDP








639 43.57 35.5 0 151.3
Gini coefficient 302 39.22 10.11 19.5 62.87
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Table 2: Correlations Among the Variables
Variable CHILD LABOR CREDIT SDGROW5 LRGDPPC RURAL EXP IMP SCH_PRIF SCH_PRIF GINI FERTILITY
           
Child labor 1
Credit -0.46 1
Standard deviation of income
growth 0.16 -0.27 1
log real GDP per capita -0.81 0.62 -0.23 1
Percent rural population 0.75 -0.45 0.13 -0.82 1
Export share of GDP -0.24 0.14 0.16 0.18 -0.27 1
Import share of GDP -0.13 0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.9 1
Primary female school
enrolment -0.49 0.23 0.06 0.48 -0.34 0.15 0.08 1
Secondary female school
enrolment -0.78 0.57 -0.22 0.84 -0.71 0.13 0.01 0.48 1
Gini coefficient 0.31 -0.33 0.31 -0.38 0.26 0.04 0.11 0.11 -0.46 1
Fertility 0.81 -0.5396 0.1952 -0.8433 0.6710 -0.1746 -0.0299 -0.5618 -0.8370 0.4523 1.0000
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N 703 474 469 703 474 469
R2 0.9276 0.9164 0.9191 . . .
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering within
countries. Marginal coefficients are reported for Tobit estimates.
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N 209 265 209 265
R2 0.8813 0.69 . .
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering within
countries. Marginal coefficients are reported for Tobit estimates. The sample is split at the mean level of log-
income (7.75)
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N 457 301 156 457 301 156
R2 0.9182 0.9270 0.9304 . . .
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering within
countries. Marginal coefficients are reported for Tobit estimates.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks (OLS, dependent variable: child labor)



























































































































































































N 474 414 408 472 471 451 455 243 338
R2 0.9217 0.9221 0.9249 0.9205 0.9177 0.9142 0.9149 0.8970 0.90
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering within
countries.
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Table 7: Robustness Checks (Tobit, dependent variable: child labor)































































































































































































N 474 414 408 472 471 451 455 243 338
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering within
countries. Marginal coefficients are reported.
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Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 9: Propensity Score Estimates of the Effect of Credit on Child Labor
Estimated
Treatment Effect











Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. The treatment effects are estimated through kernel propensity score
matching, with standard errors estimated via a bootstrap using Sianesi (2001). The estimates in column (1)
control for log real GDP per capita, log real GDP per capita2, percent rural population, and age-dependency
ratio. In column (2) we also control for child labor in 1950. In column (3), we control for lagged child
labor.
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Table 10: Dose-Response Estimates of the Effect of Credit on Child Labor
Current Treatment




























Notes: t-statistics in parentheses (computed via a bootstrap). Treatments 1 to 4 correspond to quartiles 1 to
4 of credit. The cell corresponding to row i and column j corresponds to the estimated effect on child labor
of moving from treatment i to treatment j. The propensity score controls for the variables in the basic
specification, Table 3.
